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This paper constructs a model of financial crises that can explain characteristic features 
of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, namely, the widespread freezing of asset 
transactions, the sharp contraction of aggregate output, and a deterioration in the labor 
wedge. This paper assumes that banks sell corporate bonds in the interbank market to 
raise money for short-term loans. The emergence of bad assets subsequent to the collapse 
of the asset-price bubble and asymmetric information among banks causes a freezing in 
the asset trading among banks (the market for lemons). Market freezing constrains the 
availability of bank loans as working capital for productive firms, causing output and the 
labor wedge to deteriorate. Given the market freeze, no proper incentives exist for banks 
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The global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 and 2009 was characterized by the following features:
² a freezing of transactions in the asset markets;
² a sharp contraction in aggregate output; and
² a sharp deterioration in the labor wedge.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a “toy” model that can explain these features
in a simple and clear logic and may serve as a possible building block for developing
comprehensive theory of the current ﬁnancial crisis.
The current global crisis could be understood as a severe (and possibly persistent)
recession following the collapse of huge asset-price bubbles. This family of crises includes
the US Great Depression in the 1930s and the persistent stagnation of the Japanese econ-
omy during 1991–2002, that is the Lost Decade of Japan. Some of the major economic
downturns experienced by various countries and regions, which are precisely deﬁned as
the “great depressions” by Kehoe and Prescott (2002), share the same features. In
these episodes as well as in the current crisis, enormous volumes of bad assets emerged
subsequent to the bubble collapses, followed by the freeze in the asset markets and dete-
riorations of output (and as we discuss below the labor wedge). The bad asset problem
is typiﬁed by the notorious nonperforming loans problem in Japan during the 1990s, and
now represented by the “toxic” mortgage securities in the US market.
Labor Wedge: One common characteristic of the US Great Depression and the Lost
Decade of Japan is the deterioration in the labor wedge. The labor wedge is deﬁned as
a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure for
consumers (MRS) and the marginal product of labor for ﬁrms (MPL). More speciﬁcally,
the labor wedge, 1¡τ, is a market distortion expressed as an (imaginary) labor income tax
in the following standard neoclassical growth model. As we do in the growth accounting,
we assume that the real economy is described by a neoclassical growth model (with
2market distortion represented by 1 ¡ τt), in which consumers maximize the discounted




subject to ct+kt+1¡(1¡δ)kt · rk
t kt+(1¡τt)wtlt, where β (< 1) is the discount factor,
ct is consumption, lt is labor, kt+1 is capital, rk
t is the rent of capital and wt is the wage
rate; and ﬁrms maximize the period proﬁt: πt = Atkα
t l1¡α
t ¡rk
t kt ¡wtlt, where At is the
productivity and α is the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas production technology. The
labor wedge 1 ¡ τt is measured by
1 ¡ τt =
¡Ul/Uc
(1 ¡ α)At(kt/lt)α. (1)
In the case where U(c,1 ¡ l) = lnc + ϕln(1 ¡ l), the labor wedge is
1 ¡ τt =
ϕct
(1 ¡ α)(1 ¡ lt)At(kt/lt)α =
ϕct
(1 ¡ α)(1 ¡ lt)(yt/lt)
.
Using this equation, the labor wedge of any economy is measured from the macroeco-
nomic data of consumption, labor, and output. In the literature of neoclassical studies
on “great depressions of the 20th century,” (Kehoe and Prescott 2002), it is shown that
the labor-wedge deterioration has been a key driving force of downturns in the US Great
Depression (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2007; Mulligan 2002) and in the 1990s in
Japan (Kobayashi and Inaba 2007).1 Shimer (2009) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2009) emphasize that the labor wedge is a key factor not only in the great depressions
but also in the usual business cycles. In the studies of the current global crisis, the labor
wedge is not yet draw much attention of economic researchers. To my knowledge, the
following ﬁgures are the ﬁrst ones that show the drastic movement in the labor wedge in
the United States during the crisis of 2008–2009.
1It should be noted that the literature found that another major factor of the downturns has been
the deterioration of the total factor productivity (TFP) in the US Great Depression (Cole and Ohanian
1999; and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2007), in other great depression episodes (Kehoe and Prescott
2002) and in the 1990s in Japan (Hayashi and Prescott 2002).
3Figure 1: U.S. Labor Wedge (1990–2009)
Figure 2: U.S. Labor Wedge (1964–2009)
As Figures 1 and 2 show, the labor wedge 1 ¡ τt drastically declined since the second
quarter of 2008. Data shows that output and consumption declined sharply in 2008 and
stop declining in 2009, while labor declined even more sharply in 2008 and continues
declining in 2009. This sharp decline in the labor wedge is a bit puzzling because usual
explanation for cyclical movements in the labor wedge is concerned with the labor market
institutions. As Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2009) and Shimer (2009) argue, usual
suspects of the labor wedge deterioration are
² a rise in the disutility of work,
² a rise in the labor and/or consumption taxes,
² a rise in the monopoly power of the labor unions, and
² a rise in the search frictions in the labor market.
All these factors are concerned with the labor market or the labor institutions. None of
these factors seemed present in the current ﬁnancial crisis. The fact that the labor wedge
deteriorated as the ﬁnancial turmoil deepened seems to indicate that ﬁnancial frictions
may be a primary factor that drives the labor wedge.2 We pursue this possibility in our
model below.
Related literature: Analyses and policy proposals for the current global crisis are
found in Brunnermeier et al. (2009). The motivation of our paper is most close to
Beaudry and Lahiri (2009) in that they intend to explain not only collapse in the credit
market but also shrinkage of the aggregate output. Our focus on the labor wedge is
diﬀerent from them. Shreifer and Vishny (2009) is also close to our paper in showing
2Business cycle accounting results on Japan and Korea by Otsu and Pyo (2009) indicate that both
the TFP and the labor wedge may be driven by the ﬁnancial frictions.
4that changes in asset prices may exacerbate real ineﬃciency. One feature of our model
is that it is built on the standard neoclassical growth model, while both Beaudry and
Lahiri (2009) and Shreifer and Vishny (2009) have diﬃculty in incorporating their models
with the standard business cycle literature. Diamond and Rajan (2009) demonstrate a
diﬀerent mechanism for the credit freeze that a risk-shifting from investors to banks
may cause the freezing of asset trade. Our market structure is close to that in Kiyotaki
and Moore (2004, 2005), in which a certain asset works as inside money. Kiyotaki and
Moore focus on the conditions for emergence of inside money, while we focus on those for
the collapse of inside money due to emergence of new bad assets that cause the lemon
problem.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we construct the
model. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀect of the emergence of bad assets in ﬁnancial crises
and speciﬁes the dynamics and steady states. Section 4 provides policy implications and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model builds on the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model. Two key fric-
tions are introduced: First friction in our model is the necessity of money as a medium of
exchange in the labor market, which reduces to a constraint similar to the cash-in-advance
constraint in Lucas and Stokey (1987). Second friction is the asymmetric information
about assets among banks who trade the assets in the interbank market. The emergence
of bad assets in the interbank market and asymmetric information causes freezing in
asset trading among banks due to the same mechanism as Akerlof’s (1970) market for
lemons.
52.1 Baseline – A Neoclassical Growth Model
Before describing our model, let us review the standard neoclassical growth model as the






subject to ct + kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ δ)kt · rk






t kt ¡ wtlt.




= (1 ¡ α)At(kt/lt)α, (2)
Uc t = βUc t+1fαAt(lt/kt)1¡α + 1 ¡ δg, (3)
ct + kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ δ)kt = Atkα
t l1¡α
t , (4)
where Uc t = ∂
∂ctU(ct,1 ¡ lt) and Ul t = ∂
∂ltU(ct,1 ¡ lt).
2.2 Setup
The model is a closed one-sector economy with discrete time that continues from zero
to inﬁnity: t = 0,1,2,¢¢¢ ,+1. There are continua of consumers, ﬁrms, and banks,
whose measures are normalized to one. These agents live forever. There is also the
government (or the central bank) that can provide cash to banks and impose taxes on
consumers. In this model all variables are described in the real term, that is, in terms of
the consumption goods and we are not interested in nominal variables. So for simplicity,
we ﬁx the nominal price of the goods at one. This assumption implies that the gross
rate of return on mt is 1, where mt is the real balance. (To modify our model so that
the central bank conducts monetary policy that allows price changes is not diﬃcult.)
The market structure in a representative period t is as follows. At the beginning of the
period t, a representative consumer holds bank deposit (dt) as her asset; a representative
ﬁrm holds capital (kt) as its asset, while it has outstanding corporate bonds (bt) as its
6liability; and a representative bank holds corporate bonds and cash reserve (mt) as its
assets and bank deposits as its liability. Since the ﬁrm purchases the capital by issuing
bonds, it is the case that
bt = kt,
for all t.3 The balance sheet identity of the bank is that
dt = bt + mt.
We assume that there is no asymmetric information between the ﬁrm and the lending
bank. (As we posit later, asymmetric information exists only between banks.)
Labor market and interbank market: During the period t, the labor market and
the interbank market open. We introduce a key market friction in the labor market, i.e.,
the anonymity of sellers (consumers) and buyers (ﬁrms) of the labor input. Because of
the anonymity of the market, the sellers cannot trace the buyers after the trade (of labor
input) is done. Therefore, trade by credit is impossible in the labor market, and the
wage must be paid in cash.4 Under the necessity of cash payment in the labor market, a
ﬁrm who wants to hire labor input lt must raise wtlt units of cash in advance, where wt
is the wage rate. The ﬁrm requests a bank to make an intra-period loan wtlt at interest
rate xt. (Note that xt may be 0.) The bank in turn needs wtlt units of cash to make
an intra-period loan and it sells some portion of its bond holding bt to other banks at
the interbank price of the bonds (qt) to raise money. The ﬁrm borrows the money and
pays wtlt to the consumer in cash. The consumer then deposits the wage wtlt in her
bank immediately. Although we may be able to assume that the timing of wage payment
comes at random to each ﬁrm and so does the timing of short-term lending from each
bank to a ﬁrm, we assume alternatively as follows in order to clarify the ﬂow of cash:
3More precisely, if b0 = k0 in the initial period 0, the perfect competition among ﬁrms implies that
proﬁts are zero after wage payment and bond redemption. Therefore the purchase of kt+1 must be
ﬁnanced by issuing bt+1 for all t ¸ 0.
4This logic that the anonymity of the market induces the necessity of cash payment is borrowed from
monetary theory by Lagos and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007). The anonymity
may be interpreted as the lack of memory as in Kocherlakota (1998).
7Assumption 1 During the period t, the (labor and interbank) market open twice se-
quentially. The market that open early is called the early market and the market that
open late the late market. Consumers, ﬁrms and banks are divided into the two markets.
An agent allocated to the early (late) market in period 0 is allocated to the early (late)
market in all subsequent periods.
A half of the consumers who are allocated to the early market are called the early
consumers, and the other half who are allocated to the late market are called the late
consumers. We deﬁne the early ﬁrms, the early banks, the late ﬁrms, and the late banks
similarly. When the early market opens, the early banks raise money by selling some
portion of their corporate bonds to the late banks, and they lend the money to the early
ﬁrms. The early ﬁrms in turn pay wages in cash to the early consumers, who immediately
deposit the wage in the early banks. Then the late market opens. the late banks raise
money by selling their corporate bonds to the early banks, and they lend the money to
the late ﬁrms, who pay wages in cash to the late consumers, who immediately deposit
the wage in the late banks.
Goods market and asset market: At the end of the period t, the goods market
and the asset market open. These markets are Walrasian market in which trade by
credit is available and cash payment is not necessary. At this point, ﬁrms produce the
consumption goods, yt = Atkα
t l1¡α
t and sell ct to consumers and install kt+1 by issuing
bonds, bt+1 = kt+1. Corporate bonds bt and the bank deposits dt earn interest at the
market rate and become (1 + rt)bt and (1 + rt)dt respectively. We assume for simplicity
that the government conducts monetary policy such that the bond rate and the deposit
rate become identical in equilibrium. See below.
Monetary policy: The government conduct the following monetary policy, which is
ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax gt imposed on the consumers.
² The government sets the money supply mt at the beginning of period t (or at the
end of period t ¡ 1),
8² the government makes cash injection rm
t mt at the end of the period t to the bank
that held cash reserve mt at the beginning of the period t, and
² the government sets the rate of injection rm
t such that banks’ demand for reserve
(mt) equals the money supply: mt = mt.
2.3 Equilibrium without Bad Assets
First, we specify the normal equilibrium where there is no bad assets on the bank balance
sheets and therefore no asymmetric information emerges in the interbank market. It is
shown that the normal equilibrium is exactly same as the equilibrium of the baseline
neoclassical growth model described by equations (2)–(4).





βtU(ct,1 ¡ lt), (5)
subject to ct + dt+1 · (1 + ˜ rt)dt + ˜ wtlt + πt ¡ gt,
where (˜ rt, ˜ wt) = (re
t,we
t) if the consumer is the early consumer and (˜ rt, ˜ wt) = (rl
t,wl
t)
if the consumer is the late consumer, πt is the dividend from the ﬁrm, and gt is the
lump-sum tax.
Firm: The ﬁrm maximizes the discounted sum of the proﬁt ﬂows, which is discounted







subject to k0 = b0, (7)
where πt = Atkα
t l1¡α




t) if the ﬁrm is the early ﬁrm and (˜ xt, ˜ rt, ˜ wt) = (xl
t,rl
t,wl
t) if the ﬁrm is the late
ﬁrm. The condition k0 = b0 implies that in equilibrium under perfect competition,
kt = bt for all t (¸ 1).5
5If ﬁrms hold suﬃcient money (m
f
t ) in advance, ﬁrms may be able to pay wages without borrowing
from banks. Under the following assumptions, however, it is shown that 8t, m
f
t = 0 even if ﬁrms are
9Bank: The problem for a bank is








where ˜ π = πe if the bank is the early bank and πl if it is the late bank. πe and πl are
are speciﬁed below.
Early bank: At the beginning of the period t, an early bank has mt and bt as its
assets and dt as its liability. In the early market, the early bank sells be units of bonds
to late banks at price qe to raise money for the short-term lending to an early ﬁrm. The
bank lends se = mt + qebe units of money to the ﬁrm at the intra-period interest rate of
xe. The early ﬁrms pay wages in cash to the early consumers and the early consumers
deposits the cash in the early banks immediately. Therefore the early bank receives me
units of cash as deposits. (In equilibrium, se = me = wtlt.) We assume that there is
a regulation that prohibits the intra-period deposit me from earning interest. Thus the
interest rate for me is zero. At the end of the early market, the early bank has me units
of cash, se of short-term loans, and bt ¡be units of bonds as its assets and dt +me as its
liability. Then the late market opens. In the late market, the early bank buys ˆ bl units
of bonds at the price of ql from the late banks. At the end of the late market, the early
bank has me ¡ qlˆ bl units of cash, se units of short-term loans, and bt ¡ be + ˆ bl units of
bonds as its assets, and dt + me as its liability. At the end of the period t, the bank
settles the ﬁnancial transactions. Since bonds (bt ¡ be + ˆ bl), inter-period deposits (dt),
and the short-term loans (se) earn interest, they become (1+rt)(bt ¡be +ˆ bl), (1+rt)dt,
and (1 + xe)se, respectively. The bank receives the monetary injection rm
t mt from the
government. It chooses bt+1, mt+1, and dt+1 to carry over to the next period, subject to
allowed to hold cash. First, the initial value of m
f is zero: m
f
0 = 0; and second, ﬁrms cannot hoard
the proceeds of bond issuance as internal reserves. (This constraint may be imposed by the banks. If
money can be easily diverted and consumed by the ﬁrm manager and the bank cannot verify that, banks
demand the ﬁrms to secure bt+1 by collateral kt+1.) Since no portion of bt+1 can be held as m
f
t+1, the
perfect competition among ﬁrms makes that bt+1 = kt+1 for all t and ﬁrms have no surpluses for internal
reserves. Therefore, m
f
t = 0 for all t.
10the balance sheet identity: bt+1 + mt+1 · dt+1. The proﬁt of the early bank is therefore
πe = (1 + rt)(bt ¡ be +ˆ bl) + me ¡ qlˆ bl + rmmt + (1 + xe)se ¡ (1 + rt)dt ¡ me ¡ bt+1 ¡ mt+1 + dt+1,
where st = mt + qebe. Using dt = bt + mt, this equation is rewritten as
πe =(rm + xe ¡ rt)mt + f(1 + rt) ¡ qlgˆ bl + f(1 + xe)qe ¡ (1 + rt)gbe
¡ bt+1 ¡ mt+1 + dt+1,
subject to bt+1 + mt+1 · dt+1. To guarantee the inner solution it must be the case that
rm
t = rt ¡ xe, qe = 1+rt
1+xe, and ql = 1 + rt.
Late bank: At the beginning of the period t, a late bank has mt and bt as its assets
and dt as its liability. In the early market, the late bank buys ˆ be units of bonds from the
early banks. In the late market, the late bank sells bl units of bonds to early banks to raise
money for the short-term lending to a late ﬁrm. The bank lends sl = mt ¡ qeˆ be + qlbl
units of money to the ﬁrm at the intra-period interest rate of xl. The late ﬁrms pay
wages in cash to the late consumers and the late consumers deposits the cash in the late
banks immediately. Therefore the late bank receives ml units of cash as deposits. (In
equilibrium, sl = ml = wtlt.) The interest rate for ml is zero. At the end of the late
market, the late bank has ml units of cash, sl units of short-term loans, and bt +ˆ be ¡ bl
units of bonds as its assets, and dt+ml as its liability. At the end of the period t, the bank
settles the ﬁnancial transactions. Bonds, inter-period deposits, and the short-term loans
earn interest. The bank receives the monetary injection rml
t mt from the government. It
chooses bt+1, mt+1, and dt+1 to carry over to the next period, subject to the balance
sheet identity: bt+1 + mt+1 · dt+1. The proﬁt of the late bank is therefore
πl = (1 + rt)(bt +ˆ be ¡ bl) + ml + rmmt + (1 + xl)sl ¡ (1 + rt)dt ¡ ml ¡ bt+1 ¡ mt+1 + dt+1,
where st = mt ¡ qeˆ be + qlbl. Using dt = bt + mt, this equation is rewritten as
πl =(rml + xl ¡ rt)mt + f(1 + rt) ¡ (1 + xl)qegˆ be + f(1 + xl)ql ¡ (1 + rt)gbl
¡ bt+1 ¡ mt+1 + dt+1,
11subject to bt+1 + mt+1 · dt+1. To guarantee the inner solution it must be the case that
rml
t = rt ¡ xl, qe = 1+rt
1+xl, and ql = 1+rt
1+xl.
Normal Equilibrium: In the normal equilibrium where there is no bad asset, the
above conditions for the inner solutions to the early and the late bank’s problems imply
that xe = xl = 0, qe = ql = 1 + rt, rm = rml = rt. Since x = 0, the consumer’s problem
(5) and the ﬁrm’s problem (6) imply that the allocations (ct,lt,kt+1) in the early market
and the late market are the same and that the model reduces to the baseline growth
model, whose dynamics are determined by (2)–(4). The necessary condition for xt = 0
is that the early and late banks can raise suﬃcient amount of money in the interbank
market so that they can lend w¤
tl¤
t to ﬁrms, where w¤
tl¤
t is the wage in the baseline model.
We put asterisk on the variables to denote the equilibrium values that solve (2)–(4).
Thus the necessary and suﬃcient condition is that
8t, w¤
tl¤








t)1¡α+1¡δ. We simply assume that the model pa-
rameters and fmtg1
t=0 are chosen such that (8) is satisﬁed. We also assume the following
to make the equilibrium path diﬀerent in the case of ﬁnancial crisis:
8t, w¤
tl¤
t ¸ mt. (9)
3 Financial Crisis
Thus far we have showed that the necessity of cash payment in the labor market is
innocuous as long as bt is exchanged for money in the interbank market. In this case,
the model reduces to the baseline neoclassical growth model. We model a ﬁnancial crisis
as a time when bt is not accepted in the interbank market because of the asymmetric
information about bad assets among banks.
123.1 Bad Assets
We assume that (a huge amount of) bad assets emerge exogenously at the beginning of
the period 0 and they are endowed to the banks equally. n units of bad assets emerge in
period 0 and they stay in the economy unless the banks dispose of them. No more bad
assets emerge in the subsequent periods. At the beginning of period 0, n units of bad
assets are endowed to each bank. One unit of bad asset is durable paper that looks like
a corporate bond that is promised in exchange for one unit of the consumption goods at
the end of the current period. (The paper does not specify the exact date t when it pays
out. For any given t, if the bad asset exists in period t, all agents except the holder of
the bad asset regard it as a promise in exchange for the goods at the end of the period
t.) However, the issuer of the bad asset is nonexistent. The bad asset appears as a claim
on one unit of the goods, but actually it is not. The bad asset returns nothing at the end
of the period t (8t). We assume information asymmetry on bad asset n among banks as
follows. On one hand, banks know that n, which they possess, are the bad assets. On
the other hand, banks cannot distinguish other banks’ holdings of bad assets (n) from
the good assets (bt). Only after a bank buys paper in the interbank market does the
bank know whether the paper is n or bt.
We also assume that there is the following costly revelation technology of bad assets.
A bank can reveal by paying the real cost γ that one unit of its own bad asset is not
a genuine corporate bond. So if the bank pays γn, it can reveal all bad assets on its
balance sheet. (γn is the dead weight loss.) Once γn is paid by a bank, it becomes the
public information that the bank’s n are not corporate bonds. Note however that a bank
cannot reveal that a genuine bond that it possesses is not a bad asset. Therefore even
after the bank reveals all its own bad assets n, other banks are still uncertain that the
bank’s remaining assets (bt) may include bad assets.
We regard revelation of bad assets and disposal of bad assets as almost the same
event. We assume that banks can dispose of n only after revelation. If they don’t pay
γ n in period t, the banks hold the bad assets n in period t + 1.
133.2 Optimization for Banks with Bad Assets
In this subsection we describe the optimizations of agents under the existence of the bad
assets. The problems for consumers and ﬁrms are identical to those in the case without
bad assets: The consumer solves (5) and the ﬁrm solves (6).
Early bank: At the beginning of the period t, an early bank has mt, bt, and nt
as its assets and dt as its liability. In the early market, the early bank sells ne(· nt)
units of bad assets and be units of bonds to late banks at price qe to raise money for
the short-term lending to an early ﬁrm. The bank lends se = mt + qe(ne + be) units
of money to the ﬁrm at the intra-period interest rate of xe. The early ﬁrms pay wages
in cash to the early consumers and the early consumers deposits the cash in the early
banks immediately. Therefore the early bank receives me units of cash as deposits. (In
equilibrium, se = me = wtlt.) The interest rate for me is zero. At the end of the early
market, the early bank has me units of cash, se of short-term loans, bt ¡ be units of
bonds, and nt ¡ ne units of bad assets as its assets and dt + me as its liability. Then
the late market opens. In the late market, the early bank buys ˆ bl units of bonds at
the price of ql from the late banks. But ξlˆ bl turns out to be bad assets, where ξl is
the ratio of bad assets in total bond supply of the late interbank market. ξl is taken as
exogenous by each early bank. (ξl is determined as an equilibrium outcome.) At the
end of the late market, the early bank has me ¡qlˆ bl units of cash, se units of short-term
loans, bt ¡ be + (1 ¡ ξl)ˆ bl units of bonds, and nt ¡ ne + ξlˆ bl units of bad assets as its
assets, and dt + me as its liability. At the end of the period t, the bank settles the
ﬁnancial transactions. The bonds, the inter-period deposits, and the short-term loans
earn interest. The bank receives the monetary injection rm
t mt from the government. It
chooses bt+1, mt+1, and dt+1 to carry over to the next period, subject to the balance
14sheet identity: bt+1 + mt+1 · dt+1.6 The proﬁt of the early bank is therefore
πe =(1 + rt)fbt ¡ be + (1 ¡ ξl)ˆ blg + me ¡ qlˆ bl + rmmt + (1 + xe)se ¡ (1 + rt)dt ¡ me
¡ bt+1 ¡ mt+1 + dt+1,
where st = mt + qe(ne + be). Note that the bad assets (nt ¡ ne + ξlˆ bl) do not appear in
πe because they don’t yield any return in the form of the goods. Using dt = bt+mt, this
equation is rewritten as
πe =(rm + xe ¡ rt)mt + f(1 + rt)(1 ¡ ξl) ¡ qlgˆ bl + f(1 + xe)qe ¡ (1 + rt)gbe
+ (1 + xe)qene ¡ bt+1 ¡ mt+1 + dt+1. (10)
The Bellman equation for the early bank is






s.t. ne · nt, (12)
nt+1 = nt ¡ ne + ξl
tˆ bl
t,
bt+1 + mt+1 · dt+1.
Late bank: At the beginning of the period t, a late bank has mt, bt, and nt as its assets
and dt as its liability. In the early market, the late bank buys ˆ be units of bonds from the
early banks. But ξeˆ be units turn out to be bad assets, where ξe is the ratio of bad assets
in total bond supply of the early interbank market. ξe is taken as exogenous by each late
bank. In the late market, the late bank sells bl units of bonds and nl(· nt + ξeˆ be) units
of bad assets at price ql to early banks to raise money for the short-term lending to a
late ﬁrm. The bank lends sl = mt ¡ qeˆ be + ql(bl + nl) units of money to the ﬁrm at the
intra-period interest rate of xl. The late ﬁrms pay wages in cash to the late consumers
6This balance sheet identity says that the banks use the deposits (dt+1) to purchase the bonds (bt+1)
from the ﬁrms and the cash (mt+1) from other banks and consumers. Since we assume that there is no
information asymmetry between the ﬁrms and the lending banks (page 7), it is the case that bt+1 do not
contain the bad assets. Since cash is distinguishable from the bad assets, mt+1 do not contain the bad
assets either.
15and the late consumers deposits the cash in the late banks immediately. Therefore the
late bank receives ml units of cash as deposits. (In equilibrium, sl = ml = wtlt.) The
interest rate for ml is zero. At the end of the late market, the late bank has ml units of
cash, sl units of short-term loans, bt+(1¡ξe)ˆ be¡bl units of bonds, and nt+ξebe¡nl units
of bad assets as its assets, and dt+ml as its liability. At the end of the period t, the bank
settles the ﬁnancial transactions. Bonds, inter-period deposits, and the short-term loans
earn interest. The bank receives the monetary injection rml
t mt from the government. It
chooses bt+1, mt+1, and dt+1 to carry over to the next period, subject to the balance
sheet identity: bt+1 + mt+1 · dt+1. The proﬁt of the late bank is therefore
πl =(1 + rt)fbt + (1 ¡ ξe)ˆ be ¡ blg + ml + rmmt + (1 + xl)sl ¡ (1 + rt)dt ¡ ml
¡ bt+1 ¡ mt+1 + dt+1,
where st = mt ¡ qeˆ be + ql(bl + nl). Using dt = bt + mt, this equation is rewritten as
πl =f(1 + rt)(1 ¡ ξe) ¡ (1 + xl)qegˆ be + f(1 + xl)ql ¡ (1 + rt)gbl + (1 + xl)qlnl
+ (rml + xl ¡ rt)mt ¡ bt+1 ¡ mt+1 + dt+1. (13)
The Bellman equation for the late bank is






s.t. nl · nt + ξeˆ be, (15)
nt+1 = nt ¡ nl + ξe
tˆ be
t,
bt+1 + mt+1 · dt+1.
Two Types of Equilibrium: It will be shown that for small enough n, there exists
the active equilibrium in which qt < 1+rt and the bonds and the bad assets are actively
traded in the interbank market. It is also shown that for any positive n, there exists the
crisis equilibrium in which qt = 0 and the interbank trading of bonds and bad assets is
shut down. In this case, trading of the corporate bonds freezes and the banks can lend
only their own cash reserves (mt) to the ﬁrms for wage payment. Therefore, it will be
16shown that the dynamics of the crisis equilibrium reduce to the consumer’s problem (5)
and the ﬁrm’s problem (6) with equilibrium condition that wtlt · mt.
Simplifying assumptions on preference, technology, and money supply: To
show simple solution explicitly, we assume in what follows that productivity is time
invariant: 8t, At = A; and
U(ct,1 ¡ lt) = lnct + ϕln(1 ¡ lt).
We also assume that the money supply is time invariant: 8t, mt = m. Since we assumed
that the money supply satisﬁes (8) and (9), the following constraint for m is required:
m · w¤l¤ · m + minfm,(1 + r¤)b¤g, (16)
where the variables with asterisk are the steady state values of the normal equilibrium.
Equations (2)–(4) imply that the steady state of the normal equilibrium (c¤,l¤,k¤) is
determined by
c¤ = c(k¤) = [α¡1(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ) ¡ δ]k¤, (17)
l¤ = l(k¤) = [α¡1A¡1(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ)]1/(1¡α)k¤, (18)
ϕc(k¤)
f1 ¡ l(k¤)g
= (1 ¡ α)A
(
αA




Why money supply is constrained? The government should be able to control the
amount of money supply to some extent. But we do not assume that the government can
freely set the real amount of money supply. We should interpret m as the upper bound
of the money supply, and (16) is a technological constraint imposed on the government.
To justify the constraint on money supply, we borrow the logic of the ﬁscal theory of
price level (see for example, Woodford 2001): Although the government can freely set
the nominal amount of money supply, the price level adjusts such that the real value of
the money supply becomes less than or equal to the expected value of the discounted
sum of the future tax revenues. The real value of the tax revenue is determined by the
tax technology and political constraints, both of which can be plausibly considered as
17exogenous factors to our model. Therefore, we consider that the real money supply has
a natural upper bound and (16) is satisﬁed.
3.3 Active Equilibrium
In this subsection we show that for small n there exists the active equilibrium in which
qt < 1+rt and the bonds and the bad assets are actively traded in the interbank market.
We also show that for suﬃciently large n, the active equilibrium does not exist.
The FOCs with respect to ne and the envelope condition with respect to nt for (11)
imply that the constraint (12) strictly binds if rt > 0, which is the case in our model.
Similarly, the FOC with respect to nl and the envelope condition with respect to nt for
(14) imply (15) is binding. Therefore, the Bellman equation for the early bank becomes
as follows (we omit the state variables bt, dt, mt)
V (nt) =(rm
t + xe ¡ rt)mt + f(1 + xe)qe ¡ (1 + rt)gbe + f(1 ¡ ξl
t)(1 + rt) ¡ qlgˆ bl






The Bellman equation for the late bank becomes
V (nt) =(rm
t + xe ¡ rt)mt + f(1 + rt)(1 ¡ ξe
t) ¡ (1 + xl
t)(qe ¡ qlξe)gˆ be + f(1 + xl
t)ql ¡ (1 + rt)gbl




Note that all bad assets go back and forth between the early and the late banks, because
constraints (12) and (15) are binding. At the beginning of period 0, each bank is endowed
with n units of bad assets. In the early market, the early banks sell all n(= ξe
0ˆ be
0) to
the late banks, and in the late market, the late banks sell all n + ξe
0ˆ be
0 = 2n to the early
banks. Therefore, at the beginning of the period 1, the early banks hold 2n units of
bad assets and the late banks hold 0 unit of bad assets. In period t (¸ 1), the early
banks sell 2n(= ξe
tˆ be
t) units of bad assets to the late banks in the early market, and the
late banks sell 0 + ξe
tˆ be
t = 2n units of bad assets to the early banks in the late market.
We solve these equations on the premise that the solutions (be,bl,ˆ be,ˆ bl,mt) are inner
solutions. The FOCs and the envelope condition for the early bank imply rm











. The FOCs for the late bank imply
rm
t = rt ¡ xl
t, qe





t = (1 + rt)/(1 + xt) and 1
1+xt = 1 ¡ rt
1+rtξl
t. Note that xe
t = xl
t = xt. Since the
short-term rate is equal in the early and the late markets, the consumers and the ﬁrms
face the same prices in the early and the late markets: re
t = rl
t = rt and we
t = wl
t = wt.
Therefore, the allocation (ct,lt,kt+1) must be the same in the early and the late markets.
Therefore, the intra-period lending by the early bank in period t (¸ 1) can be written as
st = wtlt = mt + qe
t(be
t + 2n),
while that by the late bank is
st = wtlt = mt ¡ qe
t(be
t + 2n) + ql
t(bl + 2n).
Adding up these equations and using ξl
t = 2n

















In the active equilibrium, if it exists at all, the model reduces to (5) and (6) with equilib-
rium conditions (22) and (23). Therefore, the equilibrium dynamics fct,lt,kt+1,xt,ξl
tg1
t=0








Uc t = βUc t+1fαAt(lt/kt)1¡α + 1 ¡ δg, (25)
ct + kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ δ)kt = Atkα
t l1¡α
t , (26)
if the active equilibrium exists. The following proposition establishes the existence.
Proposition 1 If n is small enough, there exists the active equilibrium fct,lt,kt+1,xt,ξl
tg1
t=0
that solves (22), (23), (24), (25), and (26).
19(Proof) Let ξ(i) = fξ
(i)
t g1
t=0 be a Cauchy sequence on [0,1]. Deﬁne a mapping T(n)
from ξ(i) to ξ(i+1) = T(n)ξ(i) as follows. First, solve (23), (24), (25), and (26), under
the condition that 8t, ξt = ξ
(i)




































t ). If n is small enough, it is the case that
8t,b
(i)
t ¸ 0. In this case, ξ(i+1) = fξ
(i+1)
t g1
t=0 is also a Cauchy sequence on [0,1]. This
mapping ξ(i+1) = T(n)ξ(i) is a continuous mapping from the set of Cauchy sequences on
[0,1] to itself. Therefore, the Schauder Fixed-Point Theorem implies that there exists a
ﬁxed point of T(n) that satisﬁes ξ = T(n)ξ. See Section 17.4 of Stokey and Lucas with
Prescott (1989) for the Schauder Fixed-Point Theorem. The values of fct,lt,kt+1,xtg
that correspond to ξ = fξtg1
t=0 determine the equilibrium path. (Proof ends.)
The equilibrium may not be unique. Since there exist two steady states for suﬃciently
small n (see Section 3.4), there may be two diﬀerent equilibrium paths for a small n
that converge on the diﬀerent steady states. The following proposition establishes the
nonexistence of the active equilibrium for a large enough n.
Proposition 2 If n is large enough, the active equilibrium does not exist.
(Proof) We assume that n satisﬁes n > W(k0)¡m, where k0 is the initial value of capital
stock and W(k0) = maxt w¤
tl¤
t, where the variables with asterisk are those in the normal
equilibrium (2)–(4). Suppose that there exists the active equilibrium for a large n. In the





(1 + rt) ¸ 1, since ξt · 1.
In this case, wtlt · w¤
tl¤
t, where wtlt are the values in the active equilibrium. Therefore,
n > W(k0) ¡ m implies
wtlt < m + n. (27)
Condition (27) implies that for any qt ¸ 1, the banks can raise enough money for the
intra-period lending (wtlt) by selling only a strictly smaller amount of the bad assets
than n. (Moreover, banks need not sell genuine bonds to raise money.) This means that
the condition (12) and (15) do not bind in the bank’s optimization. Since (12) and (15)
20must be binding in the active equilibrium, this is the contradiction. Therefore, the active
equilibrium does not exist. (Proof ends.)
3.4 Steady State of the Active Equilibrium
The steady state of the active equilibrium (ca,la,ka,xa,ξa) is determined as the solution
to the following system of equations (note that 1 + ra = β¡1 in the steady state):
ca = c(ka) = [α¡1(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ) ¡ δ]ka,





1 + xa(1 ¡ α)A
(
αA










1 ¡ (1 ¡ β)ξa =
1
1 + xa.
It is shown from these equations that k and x are determined by
k =
B












(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ)¡α/(1¡α) ,
C = ϕ[α¡1(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ) ¡ δ],
D = B[α¡1A¡1(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ)],
E =
α
(1 ¡ α)(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ)
.
It is easily conﬁrmed that if n is suﬃciently small, the system of equations (28) and
(29) has two solutions, while there is no solution if n is large. Therefore, the active
equilibrium has two steady states if n is suﬃciently small and no steady state if n is
suﬃciently large.
In what follows, we focus on the equilibrium where the interbank market is shut
down.
213.5 Crisis Equilibrium
If bad assets n are endowed to banks at the beginning of period 0, exactly the same
reasoning as the market for lemons (Akerlof 1970) shows that for any positive value of n
there exists an equilibrium path in which the interbank market is shut down. We call it
the crisis equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For any n (> 0), there exists the crisis equilibrium in which the price of
bonds in the interbank market is 0 and banks never trade corporate bonds.
(Proof) Suppose that the prices of corporate bonds in the early and late interbank market
are zero: qe = ql = 0. Consider the late market. Equation (21) implies that the late
banks never sell the corporate bonds if ql < 1+rt
1+xl, because the marginal gain from selling
bl is f(1+xl
t)ql
t ¡(1+rt)g. Since ql = 0, the late banks surely oﬀer to sell the bad assets
to the early banks. It is shown as follows that the early banks have no incentive to bid up
ql: because each early bank is inﬁnitesimally small, the early bank can buy only the bad
assets for any bid price ql, implying ξl = 1; since ξl = 1, (20) implies that the early bank’s
marginal gain from buying ˆ bl
t (which are surely bad assets) is (1¡ξl
t)(1+rt)¡ql = ¡ql,
which is negative for all ql (> 0); therefore the early bank has no incentive to bid up ql.
Consider next the early market. Equation (20) implies that the early banks never sell the
corporate bonds be
t if qe < 1+rt
1+xe. Since qe = 0, the early banks surely oﬀer to sell the bad
assets n to the late banks. It is shown as follows that the late banks have no incentive
to bid up the price: because each late bank is inﬁnitesimally small, the late bank can
buy only the bad assets for any bid price qe, that is ξe = 1; in this case, since ξe = 1 and
ql = 0, (21) implies that the late bank’s marginal gain from buying ˆ be
t (which are surely
bad assets) is (1+rt)(1¡ξe
t)¡(1+xl
t)(qe¡qlξe) = ¡(1+xl)qe, which is negative for any
qe (> 0); therefore, the late bank has no incentive to bid up qe. Therefore, qe = ql = 0
can be equilibrium prices and in this case ˆ be
t = ˆ bl
t = 0. That is, the banks never trade
corporate bonds. (Note that if the inﬁnitesimally small banks collectively bid up prices,
the economy can shift to the active equilibrium, where qe > 0 and ql > 0.) (Proof ends.)
In the crisis equilibrium, the interbank market is shut down and therefore the banks can
22lend at most mt, their own cash reserves, to the ﬁrms for wage payment. Therefore,
the model reduces to (5) and (6) with the equilibrium condition that wtlt · mt. The




lt · mt, (30)
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the economy, which is initially in the steady state of
the normal equilibrium (17)–(19) and the bad assets emerge at t = 0. The economy
converges on the steady state of the crisis equilibrium that is speciﬁed in Section 3.6.
Figure 3: Simulation Result
Banks have no incentive to dispose of bad assets: In the crisis equilibrium,
banks have no incentive to reveal their own bad assets even though the costly revelation
technology is available. This is shown as follows. Suppose that an early bank reveal n
by paying γn, but the other early banks do not. In this case, late banks know that bad
assets are still in the early interbank market. Because of the asymmetric information,
the late banks don’t know who has the bad assets and who does not. Therefore, the
late banks still face ξe
t = 1, because the early bank who disposed of the bad assets is
inﬁnitesimally small. The same arguments as Proposition 3 hold and therefore qe
t = 0.
In the end, the early bank who paid γn cannot sell the corporate bonds in the interbank
market. So if the bank reveals its bad assets, it pays γn for nothing. Thus there is no
incentive for banks to reveal their bad assets in the crisis equilibrium.
In this model, once bad assets n emerge and the economy falls into the crisis equi-
librium, the banks hold n forever and the equilibrium path shifts from what is described
by (2)–(4) to what is described by (24)–(26) and (30).
3.6 Steady State of the Crisis Equilibrium
Since the banks have no proper incentive to dispose of bad assets, once bad assets emerge
and the economy falls into the crisis equilibrium, the economy converges on the steady
state with the bad assets. Equations (24)–(26) and (30) imply the economy converges
23on the steady state (cc,lc,kc,xc), which is determined by
cc = c(kc) = [α¡1(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ) ¡ δ]kc, (31)








1 + xc(1 ¡ α)A
(
αA




Equation (33) is the liquidity constraint for the intra-period bank loans, i.e., wclc = m.
We now compare the steady states of the crisis equilibrium and the normal equi-
librium. Let us deﬁne f(k) ´
ϕc(k)l(k)
f1¡l(k)g, where c(k) = [α¡1(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ) ¡ δ]k and
l(k) = [α¡1A¡1(β¡1 ¡ 1 + δ)]1/(1¡α)k. Condition (33) is rewritten as f(kc) = m and
the ﬁrst inequality in (16) implies that f(k¤) > m. Since f(k) is strictly increasing in
k, these conditions imply kc < k¤, which directly implies cc < c¤ and lc < l¤. Equations
(34) and (19) then imply xc > 0. Since the output is also proportional to capital, kc < k¤
implies that the output in the crisis equilibrium is smaller than the output in the normal
equilibrium. The labor wedge 1 ¡ τ is deﬁned by (1). Therefore, the labor wedge in the
crisis equilibrium 1 ¡ τc is
1 ¡ τc =
1
1 + xc < 1,
while the labor wedge in the normal equilibrium 1 ¡ τ¤ = 1. We have the labor wedge
deterioration in the crisis equilibrium.
4 Discussion
In our model, wages must be paid in cash due to anonymity in the labor market. The
ﬁrms need to borrow money from the banks, and the banks in turn need to raise money
for lending to the ﬁrms. When the interbank market functions well necessary money
for wage payments are raised without frictions and the optimal allocation is attained.
If bad assets emerge the asymmetric information about the assets among banks causes
malfunction of the interbank market, that is, asymmetric information freezes interbank
24asset trading.7 As a result, the amount of money available for working capital loans
is constrained. This coordination failure causes a structural change of the economy
from the normal equilibrium in which the liquidity constraint (8) is nonbinding to the
crisis equilibrium in which the constraint (30) is binding. Output and the labor wedge
persistently deteriorate in the crisis equilibrium. Because of the asymmetric information
among banks, no proper incentive exists for banks to individually reveal the bad assets
(or to remove the bad assets).
4.1 Policy Implication
If all of the bad assets n are revealed, the market for bt is restored. If the cost of revelation
γ n is not excessive, the revelation is welfare improving. (We assume that banks rationally
expect the values of ξe
t and ξl
t, both of which become 0, if all of n are revealed.) As a result
of the coordination failure, each bank, that is inﬁnitesimally small, has no incentive to
reveal its own n individually. Therefore, intervention by the government that accelerates
the bad asset disposals may be justiﬁed. The policy options are, for example, stringent
asset evaluations (“stress test”), which should be done repeatedly; government purchases
of the bad assets; reintroduction of stringent accounting rules for banks; and provision
of policy scheme for recapitalization (or temporary nationalization) of banks.
In this model, properly speciﬁed macroeconomic policy is also eﬀective for relaxing
the ﬁnancial constraints (30) in the market. Let us consider the following ﬁscal policy:
7The emergence of bad assets and asymmetric information about the asset quality may directly cause
a decrease in bank lending to productive ﬁrms. We may consider the following model which is slightly
diﬀerent from the model in this paper: Firms (or entrepreneurs) own the capital stock and they need
to put up the capital as collateral when they borrow the working capital (for wage payment) from the
banks; and the bad assets are endowed to the ﬁrms and banks cannot distinguish the bad assets and the
productive capital. In this setting, there may exist an equilibrium in which the banks do not lend the
working capital to the ﬁrms because of the same mechanism as Akerlof’s market for lemons. Notable
feature is that if the lemon problem occurs in the bank lending, cash injection into the banking sector
cannot increase the amount of bank lending to the ﬁrms. This phenomenon that bank lending decreases
despite of the central bank’s huge cash injection into the banks is called the credit trap. See Benmelech
and Bergman (2009) for a model of credit trap.
25At the beginning of the period t, the government gives banks (or ﬁrms) a subsidy in
the form of cash, m
g
t; and at the end of the period t, the government imposes a tax
on consumers, τ
g




t. Though the government budget is balanced within
the period t, this ﬁscal policy is still welfare improving because it relaxes the liquidity
constraint (30) to
wtlt · mt + m
g
t.
Monetary policy (or liquidity provision) can be designed as follows: At the beginning of
the period t, the government lends m
g
t units of cash to banks and collect it at the end
of the period t. This policy also relaxes (30). As we assumed in (16), however, the real
money supply has the upper bound that is determined by tax technology and/or some
political factors. Once the money supply (mt+m
g
t) hits the upper bound, the government
cannot increase it beyond the bound. In this sense, the relaxing eﬀect of the above ﬁscal
and monetary policies should be temporary and these macroeconomic policies cannot
change the ultimate steady state where the economy converges on. This is because ﬁscal
and monetary policies do not resolve the adverse selection in the interbank market and
therefore do not restore interbank trading of the corporate bonds.
4.2 Business Cycles
This model show that freezing of the market for a certain asset class may cause output
declines and the labor-wedge deteriorations by reducing available money for working
capital loans. The model may be useful too to explain productivity changes in the
business cycle frequencies. As Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) argue, ﬁnancial
constraints on ﬁnancing the purchase of the intermediate goods can appear as TFP





t, where zt is the intermediate goods and yt is the net output, changes
in ﬁnancial constraints on the purchase of zt are observed as changes in TFP in the
production function of the net output (yt = Atkα
t l1¡α
t ). See also Kobayashi, Nakajima
and Inaba (2007) for the details. In this case, the productivity changes can be driven
26by asset market freezing (due to coordination failure), because the market freeze may
tighten the ﬁnancial constraints on the intermediate inputs through the same mechanism
in our model. Therefore, we can come up with a possible hypothesis for the causes of the
business cycles: That is, freezing and unfreezing of the market for a certain asset class
may drive ﬂuctuations of productivity, output, and the labor wedge in the business cycle
frequencies.
5 Conclusion
Our experience of the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 and 2009 suggests that we should
formalize a major ﬁnancial crisis as an event associated with
² a freezing of transactions in the asset markets; and
² a sharp contraction in aggregate output.
In addition to them, we ﬁnd that a notable characteristic of the current crisis, which is
common to the US Great Depression and the 1990s in Japan, is
² a sharp deterioration in the labor wedge.
In this paper we constructed a toy model that can explain these features. Our interpre-
tation of this type of ﬁnancial crises is a decrease in availability of working capital loans
due to freezing of interbank trading of ﬁnancial assets.
The ﬁrms need to borrow money from the banks, and the banks in turn need to raise
money for lending to the ﬁrms. When the interbank market functions well necessary
money for working capital loans are raised without frictions and the optimal allocation is
attained. If bad assets emerge the asymmetric information about the assets among banks
causes malfunction of the interbank market, that is, asymmetric information freezes
interbank asset trading. As a result, the amount of money available for working capital
loans is constrained. This coordination failure causes a structural change of the economy
from the normal equilibrium in which the liquidity constraint is nonbinding to the crisis
equilibrium in which it is binding. Output and the labor wedge persistently deteriorate in
27the crisis equilibrium. Because of the asymmetric information among banks, no proper
incentive exists for banks to individually reveal the bad assets (or to remove the bad
assets). In this model, the government intervention to accelerate bad asset disposals
may improve social welfare.
References
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3): 488–500.
Benmerech, E., and N. K. Bergman (2009). “Credit Traps.” mimeo. Harvard Univ.
Berentsen, A., G. Camera and C. Waller (2007). “Money, credit and banking.” Journal
of Economic Theory 135: 171–195.
Beaudry, P., and A. Lahiri (2009). “Risk Allocation, Debt Fueled Expansion and Finan-
cial Crisis.” NBER Working Paper No. 15110.
Brunnermeier, M., A. Crockett, C. Goodhart, A.D. Persaud and H. Shin (2009). The
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation. Geneva Reports on the World Economy
11 (www.voxeu.org/reports/Geneva11.pdf).
Chari, V. V., P. J. Kehoe, E. R. McGrattan (2007). “Business Cycle Accounting.”
Econometrica, 75(3): 781–836.
Chari, V. V., P. J. Kehoe, E. R. McGrattan (2009). “New Keynesian Models: Not Yet
Useful for Policy Analysis.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1): 242–
66.
Cociuba, S., E. C. Prescott, and A. Ueberfeldt (2009) “U.S. Hours and Productivity
28Behavior: Using CPS Hours Worked Data: 1947-III to 2009-II.”
(http://alexander.ueberfeldt.googlepages.com/USHoursandProductivity1947to2009.pdf)
Cole, H. L., and L. E. Ohanian (1999). “The Great Depression in the United States from
a Neoclassical Perspective.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 23
(1): 2–24.
Diamond, D. W., and R. G. Rajan (2009). “Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze.”
NBER Working Paper No. 14925.
Hayashi, F., and E. C. Prescott (2002). “The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade.” Review
of Economic Dynamics, 5(1): 206–235.
Kehoe, T. J., and E. C. Prescott (2002). “Great Depressions of the 20th Century.”
Review of Economic Dynamics, 5(1): 1–18.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (2004). “Inside Money and Liquidity.” Working Paper,
London School of Economics.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (2005). “Financial Deepening.” Journal of the European
Economic Association 3(2-3): 701–13.
Kobayashi, K., and M. Inaba (2006). “Business Cycle Accounting for the Japanese
Economy.” Japan and the World Economy, 18 (4): 418-440.
Kobayashi, K., T. Nakajima and M. Inaba (2007). “Collateral Constraint and News-
Driven Cycles.” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 07-E-013.
Lagos, R., and R. Wright (2005). “A Uniﬁed Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy
29Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 113 (3): 463–484.
Lucas, L. E.,Jr., and N. L. Stokey (1987). “Money and Interest in a Cash-in-Advance
Economy.” Econometrica, 55(3): 491–513.
Mulligan, C. B. (2002). “A Dual Method of Empirically Evaluating Dynamic Com-
petitive Equilibrium Models with Market Frictions, Applied to the Great Depression &
World War II.” NBER Working Paper 8775.
Otsu, K., and H. K. Pyo (2009). “A Comparative Estimation of Financial Frictions in
Japan and Korea.” Seoul Journal of Economics, 22(1): 95–121.
Stokey, N. L., and R. E. Lucas, Jr., with E. C. Prescott (1989). Recursive Methods in
Economic Dynamics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Shimer, R. (2009). “Convergence in Macroeconomics: The Labor Wedge.” American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1(1): 280–97.
Shreifer, A., and R. W. Vishny (2009). “Unstable Banking.” NBER Working Paper No.
14943.
Woodford, M. (2001). “Fiscal Requirement for Price Stability.” NBER Working Paper
W8072.









  1 9 9 0 - I  
  1 9 9 0 - I V
 
  1 9 9 1 - I I I  
  1 9 9 2 - I I  
  1 9 9 3 - I  
  1 9 9 3 - I V
 
  1 9 9 4 - I I I  
  1 9 9 5 - I I  
  1 9 9 6 - I  
  1 9 9 6 - I V
 
  1 9 9 7 - I I I  
  1 9 9 8 - I I  
  1 9 9 9 - I  
  1 9 9 9 - I V
 
  2 0 0 0 - I I I  
  2 0 0 1 - I I  
  2 0 0 2 - I  
  2 0 0 2 - I V
 
  2 0 0 3 - I I I  
  2 0 0 4 - I I  
  2 0 0 5 - I  
  2 0 0 5 - I V
 
  2 0 0 6 - I I I  
  2 0 0 7 - I I  
  2 0 0 8 - I  
  2 0 0 8 - I V
 











We set Ã = 2, and ® = :36. The data of the consumption-output ratio (ct=yt) is from the Breau of
Economic Analysis. The data of hour (ht) is taken from Cociuba, Prescott, and Ueberfeldt (2009).
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  1 9 7 0 - I I I  
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  1 9 7 7 - I I I  
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We set Ã = 2, and ® = :36. The data of the consumption-output ratio (ct=yt) is from the Breau of
Economic Analysis. The data of hour (ht) is taken from Cociuba, Prescott, and Ueberfeldt (2009).








































Interest rate in early market
Figure 3: Simulation result
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